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Introduction 
The questions of peace, violence and intercultural dialogue have dominated contempo-
rary Africa to such an extent. that so '1).any fora l'lave :discussed and debated over these 
issues but with minimal results on the ground; At present, it should be. admitted that 
Africa is replete with violence perpetrated, for instance, through wars waged on polit-
ical, economic, religious, cultural and ethnic lines. The. cases in point .are: Rwanda, 
Burundi; Congo-Kinshasa, Somalia, Angola, Sudan, Liberia; Sierra Leone and Uganda 
just to mention a few. · · 
Admittedly, questions of peace and violence should be discussed after a thorough 
analysis of issues concerning cultural universalism or relativism, the possibility of 
intercultural dialogue, and whether or not intercultural dialogue is consistent with 
either cultural relativism or universalism~ These issues have been ably handled by 
Wiredu :(1996) and Oruka (1993), for instance, and I won't say much in this paper 
except to make one or two observations on Otakpor's (1993)position; Thus, it should 
be noted at the outset that this paper assumes a linguistic conceptual scheme for deter-
mining cultural dialogue, using linguistic similarities/differences asits basis, which 
might, be seen as a shortcoming of the paper. 
Another· weakness· of this paper ·is, that it lacks an in-depth· research in the various 
African languages and cultures which would· have necessitated a comparative analysis 
of several African cultures. Granted. I leave that for other scholars to address. Ulti-
mately, this paper admits intercultural conflict in Africa.and attempts to make the sim-
ple point that although there seems to be a clear notion/word for "peace''· in some 
Southern African languages, there does not seem to be any for the term "violence". In 
other words, it seems that these African languages, Chichewa in particular, ate capable 
of enlisting acts of violence without necessarily providing a general term for' what is 
known as "violence" in English, for example. 
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Initially, a few observations, comments and reactions to Otakpor(l993) who I regard 
as denying the possibility of intercultural dialogue. · 
Possibility of intercultural dialogue? 
The possibility of intercultural dialogue has, surprisingly, been deni~d by mainly those 
who embrace cultural relativism. Otakpor (1993:58), for instance, makes a case for cul-
tural relativism by arguing that culture is "essentially a boundary marker which not 
only separates man from animality, but also sets groups apart from one another. Evi-
dence from both history and experience" he insists, "support the view that human 
beings are many and vary in customs, beliefs and outlook" 
Now, the question is: What is cultural relativism? Following in the footsteps of 
Mitchell (1979), Otakpor (1993:60) defines cultural relativism as the doctrine that "a 
culture can only be understood in its own terms, and that standards from other cultures 
cannot (my emphasis) be applied to it", and "that culture moulds personality, and that 
the ideas of normality and deviance, for example, are relative to particular cultures". 
What is clear from Otakpor's rendition of cultural relativism is that it completely 
throws overboard the possibility of intercultural comprehension by denying, for 
instance, that a Yoruba can understand a Luo or a Zulu. Surely people from one culture 
have been acquainted with other cultural practices and customs, and even Otakpor him-
self is not an exception. 
And here I should hasten to point out that even if it is granted that what is normal or 
deviant varies from one culture to another, the idea or principle of normality or 
deviance pervades all cultures. 
However, Otakpor sees the defence of cultural relativism as lying not so much in the 
denial of concepts universally employed in various cultures as in the specific justifica-
tions of those concepts and notions in a particular culture. Quite rightly, he does admit 
the existence of "certain invariant ethical (and cultural) norms, certain invariant rules 
of good conduct common to the entire human family"; cites, as examples, the disap-
proval in any culture of" wanton killing, cheating, lying or the abuse of other persons"; 
and goeson to conclude that although all cultures disapprove of these acts, that "is not 
to say that the reasons behind the prohibitions are universalisable ... the reasons are 
largely informed by particular customs and traditions ... the reasons are culturally based 
and determined" (1993:60-61). But to admit the existence of moral or cultural concepts 
in disparate cultures is to accept the existence of universalisable concepts. And again. 
the fact that the justifications of such concepts are cu)ture-'Specific does not imply the 
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non-universalizability of the concepts in question; all what cultures do is to domesti-
cate these pervasive concepts by providing their justification in specific cultural terms 
and expressions. 
The concepts themselves, in my view, are and still remain universal; the means to them 
or the justification for them can be culture-specific and hence particular. 
Cultural relativists go to the extent of denying cultural universals, the admission of the 
existence of which is seen by them as a defense for cultural universalism. As a cultur-
al relativist, Otakpor, for instance, argues that "the possibility of a 'cultural universal' 
is remote because culture can only be in the particular and can be understood, if at all, 
only in that framework. There cannot be a culture universal because that negates the 
idea of a culture area, that is, the geographical area in which there is a high degree and 
consisting of traits and custom in substantial differences from other areas or regions. 
There is no one single way of life common to the entire human race though there is only 
one human race" (1993:59). Notice here the difference between 'cultural universal' and 
'culture universal'. The former implies the existence of elements of a culture which 
also obtain in all other cultures whereas the latter implies, not elements of a culture, but 
rather a universal culture encompassing the whole human race. Now, that there is no 
universal culture is quite easy to assert, but that there are cultural universals is a bone 
of contention between cultural relativists and universalists. 
Secondly, the fact that cultures thrive in specific geographical locations should not be 
a reason for denying the existence of cultural universal. Similarities and differences do 
prevail among cultures from different locations just as there are similarities and differ-
ences among humans from the same or different ethnic groups, races and cultures. 
Thus, the specific geographical locations of cultures do not in any way militate against 
the possibility of inter-cultural dialogue and comparison. The main weakness of cul-
tural relativism is the overemphasis on cultural differences at the expense of cultural 
similarities. Cultures do interact at various levels and in varying degrees, and such sim-
ilarities are possible only if both cultural differences and similarities are asserted. So 
much on cultural relativism. Let us now consider the case for cultural universalism. 
Cultural universalists do in general admit cultural differences; that semantic structures 
differ from one culture or language to another; and that these differences do indeed to 
some extent influence the thought patterns of the language users. However, they argue 
that a cross-cultural discourse is possible because "all languages share a small set (my 
emphasis) of 'universal concepts'" which, from the point of view of cultural univer-
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salism, can form a framework for not only "a cross-cultural understanding", but also a 
"cultural-independent formulation of philosophical problems" (Goddard et al, 
1995:37). Notice the admission of the cultural universalists of the smallness of the set 
of universalisahle concepts. This admission signals an implicit acceptance of the exis-
tence of dissimilarities among various cultures. And in pursuit of this line of argumen-
tation Goddard et al ( 1995) claim that these universal concepts are semantic universals. 
These are words of substantives: I (ine in Chichewa), you (iwe), determiners: this 
(ichi), other (china), quantifiers: all (zonse), some (zina), attributes: big (kulu), small 
(n 'gono), speech: say (kamba), word (mawu), actions: do (chita), move (yenda), exis-
tence: there is (pali or kuli), time: when (liti), logical notations : because (chifukwa), if 
(ngati), space: where (kuti), here (pano), under (pansi), intensifiers: very (kwambiri), 
partonomy: part of (mbali), and taxonomy. These items do exist in all languages, and 
as such Goddard et al call them universal semantic primes. 
The existence of universal semantic primes provides an opportunity for an intercultur-
al discourse because the primes "and their rules of combination constitute a kind of 
mini-language with the same expressive power as a full natural language; hence the 
term 'natural semantic meta-language (NSM). If a meaning analysis is composed pure-
ly in terms of universal semantic primes it can be readily 'transposed' without any loss 
or distortion of meaning into ... any other language" (Goddard et al, 1995:420). 
Here, I must pose to point out that Goddard's cultural universalism goes a bit too far in 
that it seems to suggest the possibility of creating a universal language, composed of 
semantic primes, of which all natural languages are instances. Such a rendition runs the 
risk of ignoring and glossing over fundamental cultural differences, and the differences 
in the semantic structure of various languages. That Goddard et al (1995) fall prey to 
such a criticism is evidenced by their explicit denial of the possibility of incommensu" 
rable aspects of cultures and languages. "The discovery that there is a common core of 
linguistically embodied 'common conceptions"', they go on to argue, "means that there 
are no utterly irreconcilable conceptual differences between languages. Cultural differ-
ences between human groups do not reside in the existence of some basic concepts in 
one cultural group and their absence in another, but rather in the ways in which shared 
pool of basic concepts are utilized" (p.43). On this I could not disagree with Goddard 
et al more. 
In fact, Goddard et al are so engrossed in such a line of argumentation that they don't 
see that the very examples they use is evidence against their claim. They quite clearly 
and aptly show that the notion of mind is culturally manufactured by the English lan-
guage, and thus differs in connotation from the notion of soul or of dusa in Russian: 
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"mind cannot even be rightly described as a 'Western' category, but is specifically and 
narrowly a category of English", they point out. "In reality, neither French, nor Ger-
man, nor Russian, has the equivalent for mind'' (p.45). Similarly, they, also put forward, 
as examples, words like 'freedom' in English, libertas in Latin, and svoboda in Russ-
ian to show the variance in meaning across the different languages and cultures (God-
dard, 1995:49-56). What these examples are evidence of is not that they are part of the 
so called 'small set' of universal semantic primes, but rather that natural languages, in 
this case English, Latin, Russian, are notorious for containing incommensurable 
notions, terms and expression. Such examples should be caveats to wholesale cultural 
universalists. 
Furthermore, what should also be borne in mind is, as Bouwhuijsen (1995) has ably 
pointed out, that even if it were granted that all natural languages share a common pool, 
albeit small, the intransitivity of the experiences of the relations of similarity and di.f-
ference at the cultural level should not be lost sight of. "If we really are to understand 
cultures against the background of the experiences of their members, we should not 
reduce cultural differences, but magnify them instead" (Bouwhuijsen, 1995:98) 
because experiences of otherness, the alien cultures as the other, differ due to the 
intransitivity of the relation of difference (Bouwhuijsen, 1995 :91 and 112). 
Secondly, to suppose that, through these so called universal semantic primes, one cul-
ture can be described in the language of another by basically translating the system of 
beliefs of the original culture in question is to ignore the distinction between orthodoxic 
and orthopraxic cultures. Orthodoxic cultures are those that are regarded as possessing 
an underlying systems of beliefs which can be inferred from the people's customs, 
behaviour, and rituals. whereas orthopraxic cultures do not value the reasons for the 
customs, attitudes and rituals nor their meanings, but rather how rituals and customs 
are correc;tly performed or followed. Studies have shown that the Akha of Thailand, the 
Gnau of New Guinea, the ancient Chinese and Romans had and "have no epistemic 
attitude towards their tradition"; and to describe their cultures as orthodoxic, as ones 
which are reflection of systems of beliefs, is to commit a category mistake. Of impor-
tance to these people is how to perform a particular ritual properly, rather than what the 
ritual means to them or what belief the ritual assumes to be true or false (Bouwhuijsen, 
1995: 100-103). Thus unlike orthodoxic cultures in which emphasis is placed on the 
meaning of, and reasons for, rituals ~nd customs, orthopraxic cultures tend to be 
semantically indifferent to the interpretations of their rituals, behaviour and customs. 
And in this regard, some African cultures, certainly the Chewa of Central Africa, are 
orthopraxic in certain respects. 
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Lastly, I would like to insist that, as can be seen from the foregoing discussion, inter-
cultural discourse or dialogue is possible irrespective of whether one embraces cultur-
al universalism or relativism. The significant difference between the two doctrines in 
that cultural universalism underscores similarity whereas relativism emphasises differ-
ence. But both principles of similarity and difference are quintessential to dialogue. 
In fact, cultures do interact precisely because of their differences and similarities. 
Orthopraxic cultures can and do engage themselves. in dialogue with orthodoxic cul-
tures just as universalists enjoy fruitful dialogues with relativists. 
'Peace', 'dialogue' and 'violence' in some African languages 
Some African languages have a clear term for 'peace'. For example, the word for peace 
in Chichewa is mtendere; in Tumbuka, mutende; in Bemba, umutende; and in Shona it 
is runyararo. However, there seems to be no general word for 'violence' in each of 
these languages. In Chichewa, for example, the closest are chipwilikiti ~nd chipolowe 
which ,respectively, could be translated as 'chaos or confusion' and 'collective physi-
cal conflict'. The latter seems a better approximation of 'violence' than the former 
because chaos or confusion is not necessarily violent whereas any physical conflict is 
bound to be violent. And in Tumbuka, there are several words, namely, viwawa, mbe-
mbe, nthimbanizgho whereas in Shona, you have hasha and ganyabvu. In the case of 
Bemba,. the only word that coulc:I be provided by those proficient in that language was 
ulubuli which has more to do with fighting than being violent in general. 
Interestingly, these languages seem incapable of providing a translation of, for 
instance, the statements that 'Mr Banda is violent' or that 'The Zulus or Kikuyus or 
Tswanas are violent'. The closest translation of such statements in Chichewa, for 
instance, would be : A Banda ndiwandeu (Mr Banda likes fighting) or Mazulu, 
Makikuyu, Matswana ndi wandewu (Zulus, Kikuyus, Tswanas are fighters or like 
fighting). It must be admitted that fighting is an act of violence, and what Chichewa in 
this case is capable of doing is merely specify the act of violence although it, as a lan-
guage, does not possess a general word for all violent acts. 
From the foregoing observations, one might be tempted to argue that since these 
African languages have a term for 'peace' and not for 'violence', then they are a peace-
loving people. But that would be misrepresenting the issue. Chichewa, for instance, 
does have a term for 'war' (nkhondo); and in Chewa culture it is recognized that 
Kunkhondo kuli chipolowe (At war there are fatal conflicts). In fact there is the 
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Chichewa proverb: Mnzako akatong 'ola maso nawe tong 'ola wako (If a person pro-
trudes.his eyes you should ahm·protrude yours), meaning that it is advisable to follow 
a tit-fo.r-tat principle in ·situations ,of conflict. l-{owever, there ').re ex.pressions which do 
indeed extol an attitude of paci.fism. The proverb: '. Ukayenda siya phazi usa~·iye mlomo 
(When you travel, leave your footprints, not your lips.) expresses that message by 
advising that when in an alien culture or· environment, one should always avoid 
conflicts. 
Lastly, it should be pointed out that the Chewa culture, at least, seems to .lean more 
towards pacifism, through dialogue (kukambilana), tolerance and compromise than 
towards violence as it is generally, said and maintained that Nkhondo kapena ndewu 
siyimanga mudzi (War or fights do not build/consolidate villages). 
7 
D. N. Kaphagawani 
Note 
*I would like to express my gratitude to three blind referees for JH for their comments 
and criticisms on this paper which, I hope, have been addressed in one way or another, 
and to AWC Msiska, P Makambe, and B Chabuka for providing me with some infor-
mation on some African languages. 
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